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How to make the metropolitan area work? Neither big
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Abstract
We study how political boundaries and scal competition interact with the labor and
land markets to determine the economic structure and performance of metropolitan areas.
Contrary to general belief, institutional fragmentation need not be welfare-decreasing, and
commuting from the suburbs to the central city is not wasteful. Thus, the institutional
and economic limits of the central city are not the same. With tax competition, the central
business district is too small. The dispersion of jobs is increased when suburbanite workers
are allowed to consume the public services supplied by the central city. This indicates the
need for some metropolitan governance.
Keywords: metropolitan area, scal competition, local labor markets, suburbaniza-
tion, administrative boundary, economic boundary
JEL classication: H41, H71, R12
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1 Introduction
According to Alain Juppé, a former prime minister of France and mayor of the city of Bor-
deaux, governments are too small to deal with the big problems and too big to deal with
the small problemswithin todays administrative limits. Bruce Katz, a vice president at the
Brookings Institution, went one step further when he said that metro governance is almost
uniformly characterized by fragmentation and balkanization, by cultures of competition rather
than one of collaboration.Empirical works conrm the idea that the institutional structure of
a metropolitan area has a signicant impact on both the e¢ ciency of its local public services
and on the welfare of its residents by inuencing the distribution of jobs and the level of housing
and commuting costs (Glaeser and Kahn, 2001; Cheshire and Magrini, 2009). Given that large
metropolitan areas also produce a sizable and growing share of the wealth of nations,1 it is
surprising that a sound economic analysis of metropolitan areas is still lacking.
The purpose of this paper is to study how the institutional design of the metropolitan area
a¤ects its economic structure and performance. To this end, we develop a new model with one
central city and several suburban jurisdictions, in which the labor and land markets interact
with the tax competition between asymmetric jurisdictions to shape the economic structure of
the metropolitan area. The standard approach in the literature on jurisdiction formation is
to focus on the trade-o¤ between the crowding e¤ect of public services, which increases with
jurisdiction size, and the unit cost of public services, which decreases with population size.
We contend that the problem may be tackled from a di¤erent, but equally important, angle by
recognizing that workplaces and residences do not necessarily belong to the same jurisdiction. In
practice, the central city attracts a large number of workers who live in adjacent but independent
areas, thus giving rise to a substantial amount of cross-bordercommuting. So workers face a
second trade-o¤. They can earn a high wage in centrally located rms and bear high commuting
costs. Or, they can receive lower pay in rms located in secondary business centers and pay less
for commuting. By combining these two trade-o¤s within a unifying framework, we distinguish
between the administrative and economic limits of the central city, a distinction that has not
attracted much attention in the literature (see, for example, Scotchmer, 2002; and Epple and
Nechyba, 2004).
Policy-makers stress the need for coordinating the actions of local governments. To seriously
assess the desirability and scope of such a move, we need to understand how local governments
interact with the urban labor and land markets. Since jurisdictions compete for tax revenue
to nance the public services provided to their residents, the institutional fragmentation of the
1For example, the estimated GDP of the metropolitan area of Tokyo or New York in 2006 is similar to those
of Canada or Spain
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metropolitan area a¤ects the location of rms and consumers. It is well documented empirically
that a geographical concentration of rms raises the productivity of those rms through various
mechanisms, generically nicknamed agglomeration economies(Rosenthal and Strange, 2004;
Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009). Despite this, another major trend is the decentralization of jobs
in secondary employment centers because land and labor are cheaper there (Glaeser and Kahn,
2004). In addition, the location of households also depends on the prices of land in di¤erent
places. Finally, since workers are free to commute within the whole metropolitan area, the
distribution of jobs is endogenous and determined together with the location of rms.
To carry out our study, we develop a full-edged general equilibrium model in which con-
sumers and rms are free to choose their location within the metropolitan area, while local
governments act strategically. Our model, unlike those in the existing literature, encompasses
the e¤ects mentioned above by combining building blocks borrowed from local public nance
and urban economics. Another distinctive feature of our model is that the central city has
better access to the metropolitan labor pool. As a result, the jurisdictions are asymmetric in a
way that di¤ers from the standard modeling approaches used in tax competition literature. In
addition, the structure of the metropolitan area can be mono- or polycentric, depending on the
parameters of the economy. For our purposes, a polycentric metropolitan area is more relevant,
with only a share of jobs in the metropolitan area located in the central city (Glaeser and
Kahn, 2001). Another feature is that our model can account for very di¤erent job distribution
congurations. For example, the employment level in the central business district (CBD) may
be higher or lower than that in the suburban business district (SBD), while the employment
ratio between the CBD and a SBD is endogenous. Because the monocentric city model is still
the dominant one in urban economics, we also study the monocentric conguration as a limiting
case.
Lastly, the framework we propose is versatile enough to study how a particular institutional
context interacts with market forces to determine the morphology and economic performance
of the metropolitan area. In the same vein, due to its simplicity, our model can be used as a
building block in analyses addressing broader sets of issues.
Our main ndings may be organized in three distinct, but complementary, categories.
1. We study the rst-best outcome, which we use later on as a benchmark (Section 3).
The planner, who aims to maximize welfare within the whole metropolitan area, determine the
economic and administrative sizes of jurisdictions by choosing where consumers live and work.
When the number of potential jurisdictions is xed, it is never desirable to amalgamate the
suburban jurisdictions with the central one. Moreover, the economic boundary of the central
city always encompasses its administrative boundary: rms and jobs are more agglomerated
than public services. This implies that the administrative and economic boundaries of the central
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city never coincide, a result that clashes with the general belief that these boundaries should
be the same (OECD, 2006). These boundaries do not coincide because the planner chooses the
size of a jurisdiction that permits the best provision of public services, whereas the optimal
size of central and secondary business centers depends on the interplay between commuting
and agglomeration economies. In addition, whether the optimal metropolitan area is mono-
or polycentric depends on several parameters. When commuting costs are low, agglomeration
economies are strong, or the total population is small, all jobs are located in the central business
district. Otherwise, the suburban jurisdictions host rms and jobs.
2. We then study the decentralized outcome when the number of jurisdictions and their
administrative boundaries are exogenous (Section 4). There are three types of players: a large
number of consumers (formally, a continuum), a large number of rms (formally, a continuum),
and a nite number of local governments. Consumers choose a residence and a workplace.
Firms choose a location and the wages paid to their employees. Jurisdictions supply a local
public good. To nance this good, local governments choose non-cooperatively a property tax
levied on their residents and a business tax paid by the rms located in their jurisdiction. Tax
competition yields a very contrasted pattern: the central city levies a higher business tax than
suburban governments.2 This is because consumers working in the central business district
(CBD) need not reside in the central city, which incentivizes its government to practice tax
exporting. This result shows the importance of working with a setting in which the commuting
pattern is fully endogenous.
We also show that, under corporate tax competition, when the population size of the central
city is optimal, the CBD is too small, whereas the central city is too large when the size of
the CBD is optimal. Therefore, redrawing the border of the central city is not the remedy to
correct the misallocation of capital within the metropolitan area. This tension stems from the
fact that the distribution of jobs is governed by a system of forces that overlaps imperfectly
with that taken into account by the local governments. As a consequence, there is no reason to
expect the two types of boundaries to coincide. Even though we have only one type of public
good supplied by di¤erent jurisdictions, our analysis calls for an economic governance at the
level of the entire metropolitan area of issues not addressed by local governments. The purpose
of this metropolitan area government is to provide integrated management of agglomeration
economies by coordinating business tax rates across the whole range of jurisdictions.3 This is
2Hoyt (1992) developed a setting in which the central citys government inuences the land rent in suburban
jurisdictions, whereas the tax policy of the government of a suburban jurisdiction has no impact on the central
citys land rent because its population share is negligible. Like us, Hoyt showed that the property tax is higher
in the central city. However, unlike us, he treated householdsresidential locations and workplaces as exogenous.
3Even though we do not discuss transportation policies, the role played by commuting in our analysis suggests
that transportation issues should also be addressed at the metropolitan level.
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in accordance with Inman (2009) who argues in favor of the creation of business improvement
districts.
3. Once it is recognized that suburbanites commuting to the CBD may consume the public
services supplied by the central city, the tax gap widens because the central city sets an even
higher tax rate to reduce the congestion costs borne by its residents, whereas suburban jurisdic-
tions now subsidize rms to restore their attractiveness (Section 5). As a result, rms located
in the CBD (SBDs) pay a lower (higher) wage to their employees. All in all, central citys
residents are hurt twice by the suburbanitesfree-riding behavior: they end up with both a lower
quality of public services and lower wages. This concurs with Katz for whom the culture of
competition that prevails in many metropolitan areas is damaging to the central city. Observe
that spillovers do not generate the misallocation of rms and jobs within the metropolitan area;
they exacerbate it.
Our analysis suggests that neither the amalgamation nor the decentralization among com-
peting jurisdictions is the best way to govern large metropolitan areas. Combining a multi-
jurisdictional political system with an economic government of the metropolitan area or a deep
inter-jurisdictional cooperation seems to be a more e¢ cient way to solve the various distortions
inherent to the working of a metropolitan economy. To some extent, such a recommendation
has been implemented in several European countries under the concrete form of scal coor-
dination (OECD, 2006). In the United States, the tax-base sharing program implemented in
Minneapolis-Saint Paul has decreased incentives for local governments to compete for a larger
tax base (Inman, 2009).
A last comment is in order. The legal environment in which metropolitan areas operate
vastly di¤ers across countries. The model presented in this paper is context-free in that it
focuses on (some of) the fundamental characteristics common to most metropolitan areas and
disregards specic and idiosyncratic issues that are important in some countries but not in
others.
Related literature. Ever since Tiebout (1956), it is widely acknowledged that a wide
portfolio of local jurisdictions allows consumers to live in the locale supplying the tax/service
package that ts best their preferences. However, once it is recognized that the provision of
public services is often governed by increasing returns, political fragmentation may generate a
substantial waste of resources. Indeed, decentralization implies that similar public goods are
supplied in a large number of jurisdictions, and thus the xed cost associated with the construc-
tion of public facilities is paid many times. This trade-o¤ has been studied independently by
Cremer et al. (1985) and Alesina and Spolaore (1997) in di¤erent, but related, contexts. These
authors reach the same conclusion: there are too many jurisdictions and, therefore, excessive
public expenditures. Though relevant when consumers are immobile, this framework is not
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suitable for studying metropolitan areas where consumers choose both where to live and where
to work, the importance of which is recognized in recent empirical works. For example, Rhode
and Strumpf (2003) showed that Tiebout mechanisms are not a dominant factor in the long-run
residential choices within the Boston Metropolitan Area, even though this metropolitan area
is often presented as the archetype of the Tiebout model. By contrast, the interaction between
land and labor markets is central to urban labor economics. However, this strand of literature
does not account for tax competition and its e¤ect on the economic structure of large cities
(Zenou, 2009).
Only a handful of papers have studied the economic organization of a metropolitan area.
Hoyt (1991) and Noiset and Oakland (1995) did not account for the fact that jobs may be located
outside the central city, while Braid (2002) disregarded tax competition. When consumers are
mobile, they live and work within the same jurisdiction in equilibrium (Braid, 1996; Epple and
Zelenitz, 1981). Perroni and Scharf (2001) studied the e¤ects of capital tax competition when
the number of jurisdictions is endogenous and individuals are immobile. Braid (2010) focussed
on the distances between jurisdictions that choose to o¤er, or not to o¤er, a local public good
that may be consumed by non-residents. He did not study, however, the interactions between
the provision of public goods and the labor and land markets.
The model is presented in the next section, whereas Section 3 describes the socially optimal
metropolitan area. In Section 4, we study the decentralized outcome, which we compare to
the optimum. We also determine the second-best outcome in which a planner chooses the
optimal administrative boundary of jurisdictions while local governments, rms and residents
pursue their own interest. In Section 5, we check the robustness of our main ndings when
agglomeration economies vary with the distribution of rms, suburbanites working in the CBD
consume the public services provided by the central city, and the central city supplies a broader
array of public services than the suburban jurisdictions. Section 6 concludes with some policy
recommendations.
2 The Model
The metropolitan economy is endowed with L consumers who are free to choose their resi-
dential location and workplace. There are three consumption goods: (i) land, which is used
as a proxy for housing, (ii) a public good provided by jurisdictions, and (iii) a homogeneous
good, the numéraire, produced by prot-maximizing rms whose locations are endogenous.
The metropolitan area does not trade with the rest of the world. Note, however, that our nd-
ings could be extended to deal with a metropolitan area trading the numéraire against goods
produced in other cities; likewise, rms could produce di¤erentiated goods under monopolistic
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competition.
2.1 Jurisdictions and the provision of public goods
The metropolitan area is formed by m+1 jurisdictions. It has a star-shaped morphology, which
means that the m  2 suburban jurisdictions are connected only to the central jurisdiction
that has a direct access to all suburbanites. Formally, the metropolitan area is described by
m one-dimensional half-lines sharing the same initial point x = 0. Distances and locations are
expressed by the same variable measured from x = 0.
The central jurisdiction (i = 0) hosts the central business district (CBD) of the metropolitan
area at x = 0, while each suburban jurisdiction (i = 1; :::;m) may, or may not, accommodate a
secondary business district (SBD) located at xsi along the ith ray. Our model does not explain
why the CBD is formed. Doing this would require introducing various types of agglomeration
economies that would make the formal analysis much more complex. We have nothing new
to add to what is known in this domain (Duranton and Puga, 2004). However, the internal
economic structure of the metropolitan area is endogenous. In particular, the distribution of
jobs within the metropolitan area is endogenous. In other words, the CBD and SBD sizes
are variable and determined at the equilibrium. Figure 1 provides a bird-eye view of the
metropolitan area.
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Figure 1. The spatial pattern of the metropolitan area (m = 8)
Consumers use a lot having the same xed size. The units of land is chosen for this parameter
to be normalized to one. The assumption of a xed lot size does not allow replicating the well-
documented fact that the population density is higher in the central city than in the suburbs.
It is widely used, however, in models involving an urban economics building block because it
captures the basic trade-o¤between long/short commutes and low/high land rents. The central
city is symmetric and shares the same border b with every suburban jurisdiction. Let Bi be the
outer limit of the ith suburban jurisdiction, the value of which is determined by the residential
choices made by consumers. As a result, the central city population (`0) and the suburban
jurisdiction i population (`i) are, respectively, given by
`0 = mb `i = Bi   b
where `0+ i`i = L. In practice, the central city population is often larger than the population
of a suburban population, i.e. `0 > `i.
Though we acknowledge that in reality the central city often provides a wider range of
public services than the suburban jurisdictions, we assume that the public expenditures of a
jurisdiction are exogenous and generate a gross utility equal to G > 0. We will see in subsection
5.1 what our main ndings become when this assumption is relaxed. Moreover, we consider a
congestible public good (e.g. hospitals or recreational facilities). Specically, the net utility
of this good is equal to G   `, where  > 0 is a constant and ` the number of users. This
modeling strategy captures indirectly the idea that a larger population must incur a higher cost
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to sustain a given utility level associated with the consumption of local public services. Only
the local residents use the public good supplied by their jurisdictions. In subsection 5.1, we
allow the cross-border commuters to consume the central citys public good. Note that we could
assume that the public service is provided by a facility located at the center of the jurisdiction.
In this case, consumers have to bear the travel cost to the public facility, which increases with
the distance between their location and the facility location. Evidently, the average distance
rises with the population size, and thus the average utility of the public good also decreases
with the jurisdictions population, as supposed here.
To nance the public good, the ith jurisdiction uses two instruments, that is, a property tax
ti levied on the land rent prevailing in the jurisdiction and a business tax Ti paid by the rms
located therein.4 Since G is xed, our setting does not address the over- or under-provision of
public goods that is generally associated with tax competition.
When a jurisdiction hosts rms, it is called a city. Whereas the administrative limit b of
the central city is exogenously given, its economic boundary y is endogenous and determined
by the location of the consumer indi¤erent between working in the CBD and a SBD. When
a suburban jurisdiction accommodates an SBD, we call it an edge city to di¤erentiate it from
the central city. In this case, the metropolitan area is polycentric; otherwise, it is monocentric.
The most interesting case to study involves edge cities since job decentralization appears to be
a powerful trend in many metropolitan areas.
2.2 Workers and land rents
Each consumer bears a unit commuting cost given by  > 0. Therefore, commuting costs are
equal x or  jx  xsi j according to the location of her employment center. Each jurisdiction
owns its land and the aggregate land rent is evenly redistributed among the residents.5
Because there are more in-commuters than out-commuters in central cities, we consider the
following three commuting patterns: (i) a consumer lives and works in the central city; (ii) a
consumer lives in an edge-city but works in the central city; and (iii) a consumer resides and
works in the same suburban jurisdiction.
When a consumer lives and works in the central city, her indirect utility is given by
V0(x) = w0   (1 + t0)R0(x)  x+G  `0 + ALR0
`0
(1)
4Our results hold true if consumers pay a head tax instead of a property tax as assumed here.
5Instead one could think of using the aggregate land rent to nance the local public good. The Henry
George Theorem holds when each jurisdiction reaches its optimal size. This condition can hardly be satised
here because the total population size and the number of jurisdictions are given. Furthermore, the land rent
capitalizes several e¤ects in our setting.
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where R0(x) is the land rent at a distance x from the CBD, while w0 is the wage paid by the
rms located in CBD, t0 the property tax levied by the central citys government, while
ALR0 = m
R b
0
R0(x)dx
is the aggregate land rent in the central city, which is evenly redistributed among the residents.
When a consumer lives in the suburban jurisdiction i = 1; :::;m and works in the central city,
her indirect utility becomes
V 0i (x) = w0   (1 + ti)Ri(x)  x+G  `i +
ALRi
`i
(2)
where Ri(x) and ti are, respectively, the land rent and property tax in the suburban city i,
while
ALRi =
R Bi
b
Ri(x)dx:
When a consumer lives and works in the jurisdiction i = 1; :::;m, her indirect utility is
V ii (x) = wi   (1 + ti)Ri(x)   jx  xsi j+G  `i +
ALRi
`i
(3)
where wi is the wage rate paid in the corresponding SBD.
Following a well-established tradition, we dene the economic boundary of the central city as
the limit of the area that includes all the individuals working in the CBD. When the metropol-
itan area is symmetric, the economic boundary y is given by the location of the worker who is
indi¤erent between working in the CBD or in a SBD:
V 0i (y) = V
i
i (y):
Without loss of generality, we assume that the opportunity cost of land is zero. The land
rent at each location in the central city is as follows. Given V0(x), the equilibrium land rent in
the central city must solve @V0(x)=@x = 0 or, equivalently, (1+ t0)R00(x)+ = 0 whose solution
is
R0(x) = r0   
1 + t0
x (4)
where r0 is a constant that will be determined in 4.1.2.
The land rent prevailing in the ith jurisdiction is given by
Ri(x) = max

0i (x);
i
i(x); 0
	
(5)
where 0i (x) (
i
i(x)) is the bid rent at x of a worker living in the ith jurisdiction and working
in the central city (the edge city i). Given V 0i (x) and V
i
i (x), the equilibrium land rent is such
as @V 0i (x)=@x = @V
i
i (x)=@x = 0. As a consequence, the bid rents are
0i (x) = r
0
i  

1 + ti
x ii(x) = r
i
i  

1 + ti
jx  xsi j
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where both rii and r
0
i will be determined in subsection 4.1.2.
Note that the land rent redistributed to consumers is jurisdiction-specic. Assuming that
the total land rent within the metropolitan area is shared among all consumers is not consistent
with the existence of independent and competing jurisdictions. In addition, our assumption
allows ignoring the external e¤ect stemming from the strategic manipulation of the metropolitan
land rent by jurisdictions.
2.3 Firms and wages
Firms produce a homogeneous good, which is used as the numéraire; labor is the only production
factor. Each rm requires a xed amount of labor, while the marginal requirement is zero. We
choose the unit of labor for the xed requirement to be equal to 1. By implication, the total
number of rms established in the metropolitan area is given by L. Firms can locate either in
the CBD or in one of the edge cities (if any), where they form a SBD.
According to Baum-Snow (2012), agglomeration economies arise mainly within the central
city, whereas Glaeser and Kahn (2004) argue that, due to the development of new information
and communication technologies, their scope has spread within the metropolitan area. Hence,
all rms located in a metropolitan area benet from agglomeration economies, but they do
so with di¤erent levels of intensity. Ideally, agglomeration economies should be modelled by
assuming that the xed requirement of labor needed to start a business decreases with the
number of rms located in its vicinity. Following such an approach renders the analysis of the
tax game intractable. This is why we consider a much simpler modelling strategy, that is, a rm
locating in the CBD benets from a more e¢ cient environment that takes the concrete form of
a cost drop E. We may then interpret E as follows: the stronger the agglomeration economies
in the central city, the higher value of E. Admittedly, this specication is very ad hoc. Our
line of defense is that it captures some of the main impacts of agglomeration economies, while
keeping the formal analysis simple. In subsection 5.2, we consider a more general description
of agglomeration economies and discuss what our main results become.
Let 0 (i) be the prots earned by a rm set up in the central city (the edge city i). When
a rm is located in the CBD, we have
0 = I   (w0   E)  T0 (6)
where I denotes the rms revenue. When a rm sets up in the ith edge city, its prot function
becomes:
i = I   wi   Ti: (7)
In each employment center, the equilibrium wages are determined by a bidding process
in which rms compete for workers by o¤ering them higher wages until no rm earn positive
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prots. Thus, setting (6) and (7) equal to zero and solving, respectively, for w0 and wi, we get
w0 = I + E   T0 wi = I   Ti: (8)
Hence, business taxes alleviate residentstax burden but they also reduce the wages earned
by workers. When consumers work and live within the same jurisdiction, both e¤ects are washed
out. This is no longer true, however, when they work and live in di¤erent jurisdictions. As a
consequence, the property tax paid in the jurisdiction where the consumer lives and the business
tax paid in the jurisdiction where she works a¤ect her utility level, whence her residence and
workplace. By implication, both types of taxes a¤ect the equilibrium pattern of activities.
Because the cost of shipping the consumption good within the metropolitan area is much
lower than the commuting cost, a rms revenue I may be considered as independent of its
location. How the equilibrium value of I is determined is immaterial for our analysis because
I does not enter the prot/utility di¤erential between any two places.
3 The Optimal Metropolitan Area
In this section, we assume that a social planner maximizes total welfare in the metropolitan
area by choosing the population of the central city and those of the suburban jurisdictions,
consumersand rmslocations, hence the commuting pattern. This is achieved by through the
choice of the optimal administrative (bi) and economic (yi) boundaries of the central city and the
number (m) of suburban jurisdictions. Our setting being symmetric about the CBD, the outer
and inner administrative boundaries of the suburban jurisdictions are such that Bi = B  L=m
and bi = b for all i = 1; :::;m.
Individual utilities being linear, the total welfare WT within the metropolitan area may be
dened as follows:
WT = PE   CC  GC   PC (9)
which involves (i) the productive e¢ ciency gains generated by the clustering of rms in the
CBD:
PE = myE
where y is the location of the individual indi¤erent between working in the CBD or the SBD;
(ii) the commuting costs borne by the individuals working in the CBD or in the SBDs:
CC = m
yR
0
xdx+m
BR
y

x  B + y2
 dx
where the planner chooses to locate the SBD at the middle point xs = (B+y)=2 of the segment
[y;B] because E is independent of distance from the CBD; (iii) the congestion costs of the
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public good borne by consumers in all jurisdictions:
GC = b2m2 +  (L mb)2 =m;
and (iv) the cost of providing a public good in all jurisdictions:
PC = (m+ 1)G:
When b < y < B there are one CBD and m SBDs; when b < y = B there are no SBDs but
m+ 1 jurisdictions; and when b = y = B there is a single city and a single jurisdiction.
3.1 The optimal economic and administrative size of jurisdictions
Assume that the number m of jurisdictions is given. By choosing b, the planner determines
the population size in each type of jurisdiction (`0 and `). Evidently, a marginal expansion
of the central city (a higher b) reduces the number of residents in all suburban jurisdictions.
Consequently, the congestion cost decreases therein, whereas it rises in the central city.
Di¤erentiating WT with respect to b yields
b =
B
m+ 1
< B: (10)
Thus, regardless of the values of L and m it is always optimal to break up the metropolitan
area into m+ 1 independent jurisdictions. The optimal size of a suburban jurisdiction is equal
to
`= B   b = L
m+ 1
> 0:
The optimal size of the central city being equal to ` = mb, the central and suburban
jurisdictions all have the same population size. As a result, congestion costs in public services
are equalized across jurisdictions. Note also that the optimal number of suburbanites is larger
than the number of urbanites. Both populations decrease at the same pace with the institutional
fragmentation of the metropolitan area (m).
Furthermore, by choosing y, the planner determines the size of the CBD (my) and that
of each SBD (B   y). Total commuting costs CC reach their lowest value when the average
traveled distance is minimized, i.e. y = B=3  b. The productive e¢ ciency of the metropolitan
area is maximized when all rms are located in the CBD, i.e. y = B. Because y does not
a¤ect directly the congestion costs GC, the optimal economic boundary of the central city
is the outcome of the trade-o¤ between commuting costs and agglomeration economies. By
implication, the optimal value of y must belong to the interval (B=3; B).
Di¤erentiatingW with respect to y, we obtain the optimal economic boundary of the central
city:
y =
B
3
+
2E
3
> b (11)
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because m  2. As a consequence, the CBD labor pool always encompasses the central city,
while the SDBs are located in the suburban jurisdictions. As the intensity of agglomeration
economies rises (E), the CBD grows at the expense of the SBDs. Likewise, when the total
population of the metropolitan area gets larger, the labor pool of both types of cities expands;
however, the employment share of the CBD decreases.
It remains to check under which condition the metropolitan area is polycentric (y < B).
This is so if and only if
E < B: (12)
In this event, the optimal metropolitan area involves m+ 1 local labor markets. Thus, high
commuting costs, low agglomeration economies, or both generate the decentralization of jobs.
In the same vein, because B increases with L, a population hike fosters the emergence of SBDs.
By contrast, because B decreases with m, a higher number of suburban jurisdictions promotes
the concentration of jobs in the central city because the average commuting to the CBD is
shorter. Moreover, as the CBD labor pool encompasses the central city, the employment rate
in the central city always exceeds 1 whereas it is smaller than 1 in the suburban cities.
In addition, the size of the CBD is equal to
my =
L
3
+
2mE
3
(13)
which exceeds the size of a SBD. Put di¤erently, the CBD is always larger than a SBD. Note,
however, that the CBD employment level need not exceed the total number of suburban jobs.
Indeed, the former is greater than the latter if and only if E > B=4. As a result, when
B=4 < E < B, the metropolitan area is polycentric, even though the CBD captures the
majority of jobs.
If the condition (12) does not hold, agglomeration economies are too strong, commuting
costs are too small, or the number of suburban jurisdictions is too large for SBDs to emerge:
y = B. Under these circumstances, the agglomeration of rms and jobs in the CBD, whence
a monocentric metropolitan area, is socially desirable. Interestingly, the labor market is inte-
grated though the metropolitan area is fragmented into several suburban jurisdictions. This
means that, at the social optimum, the institutional fragmentation of the metropolitan area
and the agglomeration of rms and jobs in the CBD do not necessarily conict.
Furthermore, for any given m  2, the optimal administrative and economic boundaries of
the central city never coincide. To be precise, the planner always chooses for the central city a
population size smaller than the population size of its labor pool. However, the suburbs may,
or may not, host rms and workers. In other words, when a benevolent planner is empowered
to choose both the residential location and workplace of individuals, merging all places within
a single large city is never socially desirable.
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3.2 The optimal number of jurisdictions
The planner may also choose the degree of fragmentation of the metropolitan area through the
variable m. Two cases must be distinguished. In the rst one, it is optimal to concentrate
rms in the CBD. Di¤erentiating WT with respect to m thus leads to the following equilibrium
condition:
L2
2m2
+
L2
(m+ 1)2
 G = 0 (14)
which does not have a simple analytical solution for the optimal number m of jurisdictions. Note
that (14) includes the trade-o¤ between the gross utility of public expenditures and congestion
costs, as in Alesina and Spolaore (1997) who do not account for commuting costs.
It is readily veried that d m=d > 0, d m=dL > 0; and d m=dG < 0. Lowering commuting
costs and/or raising public expenditures leads to a smaller number of suburban jurisdictions.
As a consequence, the optimal fragmentation of the metropolitan area is governed by the trade-
o¤between commuting costs and increasing returns. In particular, when public expenditures G
associated with a new jurisdiction is large and/or commuting costs are low, it is never optimal to
fragment the metropolitan area ( m = 0). On the other hand, fragmentation is always desirable
when the total population is su¢ ciently large.
In the second case, it is optimal to break up the metropolitan area into several cities. The
optimal value of m is now implicitly given by
L2
6m2
+
L2
(m+ 1)2
+
E2
3
 G = 0
which, unlike (14), depends on the level E of agglomeration economies.
The impact of population size (L) and public expenditures (G) is the same as in the rst
case. However, lowering the unit commuting cost () now has an ambiguous impact on the
optimal number of cities. Indeed, two opposing e¤ects are at work. On the one hand, for a
given y, decreasing the unit commuting cost reduces the total level of commuting costs within
the metropolitan area. This incentivizes the planner to select a smaller value for m because
this reduces total public expenditures. On the other hand, since y increases when the unit
commuting cost falls, m should increase to reduce total commuting costs. The former e¤ect
dominates the latter one when E is su¢ ciently low.
Proposition 1 comprises a summary.
Proposition 1 Consider a central planner maximizing total welfare within the metropolitan
area. Then, the optimal metropolitan area involves institutional fragmentation and commuting
from the suburban jurisdictions to the central city.
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4 Tax Competition and the Metro Structure
We now consider a decentralized tax setting in which the institutional environment, i.e. the
number of suburban jurisdictions and the administrative boundary between these jurisdictions
and the central city are given. Our purpose in this section is to nd how b and m a¤ect the
tax policies and the location of jobs.
The spatial structure of the metropolitan area implies that competition among jurisdictions
is strategic: each suburban jurisdiction competes directly with the central city only whereas
the central city competes with every suburban jurisdiction. The interactions between local
governments and market forces are described by a three-stage game that blends atomic and
non-atomic players. There are three groups of players: a continuum of consumers, a continuum
of rms, andm+1 local governments. Consumers choose where to live and where to work; rms
choose where to locate and the wage to pay to their employees; and local governments choose a
business tax and a property tax. In the rst stage, consumers are free to choose the jurisdiction
they want to join and their location therein, anticipating the property tax they will pay and the
wage they will earn. Therefore, in equilibrium consumers will reach the same utility level. In
the second stage, the population in all jurisdictions has already been determined, so that local
governments can choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively a business tax and a property
tax to maximize the total welfare of their residents. Last, rms choose their prot-maximizing
locations and consumers their workplace, while land and labor markets clear. The locations of
the SBDs are determined when rms choose their locations in this third stage.
Once consumers are mobile, the specication of governmentsobjective is known to be a
controversial issue (Scotchmer, 2002; Cremer and Pestieau, 2004). Our three-stage game obvi-
ates this di¢ culty because governments know who their residents are, and thus may determine
the total welfare to maximize. Moreover, the relationship between jobs and people having often
the nature of an egg-and-chickenproblem, rms choose their locations and consumers their
workplaces simultaneously.
We seek a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. As usual, the game is solved by backward
induction. Because characterizing the equilibria of all subgames is long and tedious, we nd it
convenient to restrict ourselves to the equilibrium path. In particular, consumers being mobile
and identical, they anticipate that they reach the same (indirect) utility level V  at the end
of the game. Denoting by yi the location of the consumer indi¤erent between working in the
CBD or in the ith SBD, we have V  = V0(x) for 0  x  b, V  = V 0i (x) for b < x  yi,
and V  = V ii (x) for yi < x  Bi. Though proving the existence of a (pure-strategy) Nash
equilibrium in a tax game often requires strong assumptions (Laussel and Le Breton, 1998;
Rothstein, 2007), we show the existence of a unique equilibrium.
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The socially optimal metropolitan area being symmetric, we nd it reasonable to focus on
a symmetric equilibrium: Ti = T and ti = t for i = 1; :::m. In this event, wages paid in the
SBDs are the same: wi = w for i = 1; :::;m. Anticipating this outcome, in the rst stage
suburbanites distribute themselves symmetrically around the central city, which means that
Bi = B for i = 1; :::;m. Since there is no vacant land, we have B = L=m. In addition, working
with a symmetric outcome vastly simplies the comparison between the equilibrium and social
optimum.
4.1 Labor and land market equilibrium
In the third stage, rms and consumers observe the tax rates chosen by the local governments.
Then, rms select a location as well as the wage they pay while consumers choose their working
places. Because consumers are mobile, they accurately anticipate in the rst stage that the
equilibrium land rent equalizes utility across mobile individuals.
4.1.1 Job location
To determine the distribution of jobs within the metropolitan area, we must nd the location y
of the marginal worker, which is the same along all rays. We assume throughout this section that
y exceeds b and determine the conditions for this to hold in equilibrium. As in the foregoing,
the location of the SBD (xs) is the middle point of the segment connecting y and B:
xs = y +
B   y
2
: (15)
The worker at y is indi¤erent between the CBD or the SBD if and only if V 0i (y) = V
i
i (y)
or, equivalently,
w0   wi = y   (xs   y) =  3y  B
2
: (16)
In other words, CBD- and SBD-workers do not earn the same wage and the di¤erence
between wages must compensate the marginal worker for the di¤erence in commuting costs
along any ray. Plugging (8) and (15) into (16), we obtain the equilibrium economic boundary
of the central city:
y(T0; T ) =
B
3
+
2[E   (T0   T )]
3
(17)
which generally di¤ers from the administrative boundary b. Evidently, the economic boundary
expands (shrinks) with T (T0) because the central city becomes relatively more (less) attractive.
Furthermore, the equilibrium shares of rms located in the CBD and in a SBD are, respec-
tively, given by
0 =
my
L
 =
B   y
L
: (18)
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Using (17), it is readily veried that my increases with m if and only if E is greater than
T0   T , that is, the wage paid in the CBD exceeds that paid in an edge city. In this case, a
more fragmented metropolitan area has smaller SBDs.
4.1.2 Land rent
We now turn to the determination of the equilibrium land rents. Since all the tax rates are
given, (1) and (8) imply that the (indirect) utility of a consumer residing in the central city is
given by
V0(x) = I +G+ E   T0   (1 + t0)R0(x)  x  `0 + ALR0
`0
(19)
for 0  x  b. There are two groups of suburbanites living in the ith jurisdiction: those who
work in the CBD and pay the land rent R0i , and those who work in their SBD and pay the land
rent Rii. Using (2) and (8) shows that the utility of a consumer belonging to the rst group is
V 0i (x) = I +G+ E   T0   (1 + t)R0i (x)  x  `+
ALR
`
(20)
with b < x  y, while using (3) and (8) implies that the utility of a consumer belonging to
the second group is
V ii (x) = I +G  T   (1 + t)Rii(x)   jx  xsi j   `+
ALR
`
(21)
with y < x  B. Using the equilibrium conditions V 0 = V 0i = V ii = V , we are now equipped
to determine the value of r0 for the central city as well as the values of r0i and r
i
i for the suburban
jurisdictions.
Because there is no competition for land at y and B, we have Rii(y
) = Rii(B) = 0 . This
in turn implies
rii =
 (B   y)
2(1 + t)
which yields
Rii(x) =
 (B   y)
2(1 + t)
  
1 + t
jx  xsj:
Replicating this argument where R0i (y
) = 0, we obtain
r0i =

1 + t
y
and thus
R0i (x) =

1 + t
(y   x):
Using the above two expressions for the land rents, we get the aggregate land rate in any
edge city:
ALR =

1 + t

(y   b)2
2
+
(B   y)2
4

(22)
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which decreases with the property tax rate t.
Using the equilibrium condition V0(b) = V 0i (b) and (4), we get
r0 =
1
1 + t0

 (y   b) + (`  `0) + ALR0
`0
  ALR
`

(23)
which shows that the central citys land rent capitalizes the di¤erences in congestion costs and
in the aggregate land rent redistributed across local residents. For any given value of t0, whence
of r0, we have
R0(x) = r0   
1 + t0
x:
Consequently,
ALR0 = m
bZ
0
R0(x)dx =
`0
t0



y   b
2

+ (`  `0)  ALR
`

(24)
which also decreases with the property tax set in the central city. Plugging this expression in
(23) shows that r0 depends on the two property tax rates, whereas rii and r
0
i are independent
of t0.
Figure 2 provides a side view of the land rent prole. It shows that the land rent is
not continuous at the boundary b because consumers just inside and outside that boundary
face di¤erent property taxes and congestion costs and live in jurisdictions that have di¤erent
populations, di¤erent costs per capita of nancing the public good, and di¤erent aggregate land
rent per capita.
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Figure 2. Equilibrium Land Rent
Furthermore, the equilibrium land rents Rii (x), R
0
i (x) and R0 (x) fully capitalize the prop-
erty tax levied by the jurisdiction containing the location x. Hence, when the local tax increases,
the land rent is shifted downward. Note, however, that while Rii (x) and R
0
i (x) do not depend
on the central citys property tax, the tax policy of the suburban jurisdictions generates a scal
externality capitalized in the land rent paid in the central city. Indeed, (4) and (24) imply
that R0 (x) rises with t. Moreover, our framework allows determining the costs and benets
that are capitalized and where the capitalization arises (Starrett, 1981). There is external
capitalizationin the central city because workers move from the suburban jurisdictions to the
CBD.
Before proceeding, note also that the full price of land in the central city, dened by (1 +
t0)R0 (x), decreases (increases) with t0 (t) through a pure land capitalization e¤ect of the
property tax rates captured by r0. By contrast, the full price of land (1+t)Rii(x) and (1+t)R
0
i (x)
that prevail in the suburban jurisdictions are independent of the property tax. This property
crucially depends on the assumption of symmetric suburban jurisdictions.
4.2 Tax competition between the central and suburban jurisdictions
Business and property taxes allow each local government to nance the local public good
provided to its residents. Hence, the budget constraint of jurisdiction i = 0; 1; :::; n is given by
G = TiiL+ tiALRi
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where Ti is the business tax and ti the property tax levied in jurisdiction i. One appealing
feature of our tax game is that we may determine the business tax rates independently of the
property tax rates.
4.2.1 Business tax
Local governments set non-cooperatively their business tax rates with the aim of maximizing
the welfare of their residents. Specically, the central city maximizes W0 with respect to T0,
while every suburban jurisdiction maximizes W with respect to T . Since rms choose their
locations in the third stage, governments anticipate the consequences of their choices on the
size of their business districts. Depending on the impact of tax competition on rmslocations,
two cases may arise:  > 0 (0 < 1) and 
 = 0 (0 = 1).
The polycentric metropolitan area At the tax competition stage, the welfare in the central
city is given by
W0 = m
bR
0
V (x)dx = `0(I +G+ E   T0)  t0ALR0    mb
2
2
  l20 (25)
where we have used (19). Substituting the budget constraint G = T00L + t0ALR0 and the
labor market balance condition 0L = `0 +m(y   b) into (25), we obtain
W0 = `0 (I +G+ E) +mT0(y
   b) G   mb
2
2
  `20 (26)
where `0 = mb.
The novelty here is that raising the business tax T0 gives rise to two opposing e¤ects. First,
through the lower wage paid to the CBD workers (see (8)) a higher business tax generates tax
exporting because a fraction of the CBD workers lives outside the central city (y > b).6 A
higher business tax also induces a few suburban workers to shift to their respective SBD, which
means that the extent of tax exporting (y   b) shrinks with T0. In other words, a rise in T0
yields a smaller CBD, that is, a smaller scal basis. The equilibrium corporate tax in the central
city is the outcome to this trade-o¤. Note that a marginal increase in T0 has no impact on the
commuting costs within its jurisdiction because all the residents work in the CBD. However,
by reducing the number of CBD rms, it a¤ects the commuting costs paid by the suburban
consumers, an e¤ect not internalize by the central city government.
A suburban jurisdiction involves two types of workers, those who work in the CBD and
those who work in their own SBD. Using (20) and (21) as well as the budget constraint F =
6See Wildasin and Wilson (1998) for a discussion on tax competition with tax exporting.
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TL+ tALR where L = B   y, the total welfare in a suburban jurisdiction is given by
W = (y   b)(I +G+ E   T0) + (B   y)(I +G  T ) + T (B   y) G
 
 
yR
b
xdx+
BR
y
 jx  xsj dx
!
  l2: (27)
Note that the total commuting costs borne by the residents of an edge city are given by
yR
b
xdx+
BR
y
 jx  xsjdx = 
"
(y)2   b2
2
+
(B   y)2
4
#
:
A marginal decrease in T raises the share of jobs in the SBD, and thus reduces commuting
costs within the ith edge city. In addition, a smaller number of rms in the CBD decreases the
productive e¢ ciency of the metropolitan area. A suburban government takes into account the
e¢ ciency loss occurring within its sole jurisdiction through the lower wage paid to some of its
residents. In sum, unlike the central city government, a suburban government cares about the
trade-o¤ between commuting costs and agglomeration economies, but it does so within its own
jurisdiction only.
Di¤erentiating W0 (W ) with respect to T0 (T ) yields:
dW0
dT0
=
2mE
3
  2m (2T0   T ) + 3`0
3
+
L
3
(28)
and
dW
dT
=  2T
3
(29)
where d2W0=dT 20 < 0 and d
2W=dT 2 < 0 hold. Using (29), we obtain
T  = 0: (30)
In other words, the suburban governments neither tax nor subsidize rms. Plugging (30)
into (28) and solving for T0, we get the equilibrium business tax set in the central city:
T 0 =
E
2
+
 (B   3b)
4
: (31)
Hence, the business tax set by the central city raises with the intensity of agglomeration
economies, whereas the elasticity of the scal basis decreases with  (see (17)).
Observe that T 0 decreases with b. Indeed, when b increases, it follows from (17) that the
scal basis remains the same when T0 and T are given. Hence, the extent of tax exporting y b
shrinks. This incentivizes the central citys government to lower its tax rate to expand its scal
basis. Furthermore, B = L=m decreases with the number of suburban jurisdictions, and thus
the equilibrium tax rate increases. As in Hoyt (1991), but in a di¤erent context, reducing the
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number of suburban jurisdictions softens tax competition and allows the central city to set a
higher business tax.
Note that, at the tax rates (31) and (35), the economic boundary of the central city is given
by
y =
B
6
+
E
3
+
b
2
: (32)
This expression shows how  and E interact to determine the economic boundary of the
central city through the ratio E= : the lower commuting costs or the stronger agglomeration
economies, the larger number of suburbanites working in the CBD. This cross-border commut-
ing ow highlights how the suburban areas benet from the productivity gains generated by the
concentration of rms in the central city (Haughwout and Inman, 2009). Furthermore, the eco-
nomic size of the central city also rises with its administrative size. Last, when the metropolitan
area population L gets larger all employment centers grow. However, the CBD grows at a lower
rate than the SBDs. As a result, when the population of the metropolitan area is su¢ ciently
large, the number of suburban jobs exceeds the number of jobs in the central city.
It remains to check that b < y < B. The condition y < B holds if and only if
b < b^  5B
3
  2E
3
: (33)
Thus, for the metropolitan area to be polycentric, it must be that E < 5B=2. In other
words, jobs are decentralized at the tax competition outcome when at least one of the following
conditions is satised: (i) the metropolitan area population is large, (ii) commuting costs are
high, and (iii) agglomeration economies are not too large.
Furthermore, y > b if and only if
b < ~b  B
3
+
2E
3
(34)
which means that the central city population cannot be too large for the CBD to attract
suburbanite workers. When b  ~b, we show in Appendix A that y = b. In other words, the
economic limit of the central city is never smaller than its administrative limit.
The next proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 2 The central city government always sets a positive business tax whereas the
suburban governments do not tax or subsidize rms.
The positive tax di¤erential reects the asymmetry between the central and edge cities. In
particular, the tax di¤erential widens when agglomeration economies in the central city get
stronger. The intuition behind this nding is clear. As noted by Baldwin and Krugman (2004),
a locale with a comparative advantage can set a higher corporate tax rate because more rms
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are located there. This implies a larger number of cross-border commuters, and thus a broader
extent of tax exporting.
How does the wage di¤erential between CBD- and SBD-workers vary with the population
size? Imagine a ow of in-migrants who occupy the suburban areas, thus implying urban sprawl
through an increase in B. It then follows from (31) and (35) that the tax rate in the central
city rises whereas the tax rate set by the suburban jurisdictions remains equal to 0. As a
consequence, w0 decreases while w
 = I. This in turn implies that the wage di¤erential w0 w =
3(y   B=3)=2 shrinks when L increases. It is positive if and only if L < 3bm + 2Em= . In
other words, as the metropolitan population L rises, a growing share of the labor force works
in the edge cities. In the limit, when the inequality no longer holds, the SBD-workers earn a
higher wage than the CBD-workers. Despite its comparative advantage in terms of accessibility
and the existence of agglomeration economies, wages in the central city fall below those paid
in the edge cities. Yet, a fraction of suburbanites still choose to work in the central city, the
reason being that the suburban jurisdictions become so large that, for the workers close to the
boundary b, commuting to the SBD is more expensive than commuting the CBD.
The reversal of fortune between the CBD and the SBDs is the reection of the insu¢ -
cient exploitation of the agglomeration economies in the central city whose relative size in the
metropolitan area becomes smaller. For the metropolitan area to better exploit the productivity
gains associated with the concentration of rms, the administrative boundary of the central
city must be increased. This shows once more how the boundary of the central city may a¤ect
the e¢ ciency of the metropolitan area and the welfare of its inhabitants, especially in a context
of rapid urban growth.
Note, however, that the disadvantage of being a small central city may be overcome if
commuting costs are su¢ ciently low. In this case, more jobs are created in the CBD, which
allows a better exploitation of agglomeration economies while the central citys government sets
a lower business tax.
The monocentric metropolitan area When (33) does not hold, all jobs are concentrated
in the CBD and the urban labor market is integrated. In other words, when agglomeration
economies are su¢ ciently strong, we fall back on the standard monocentric city model of urban
economics (Fujita, 1989; Zenou, 2009). The corresponding equilibrium tax paid by the CBD
rms is obtained by replacing b with b^ into (31), that is, the value of b that satises y = B or,
equivalently,  = 0:
T 0 =
E
2
+
(B   3b^)
4
= E   B: (35)
This expression is always nonnegative because E < B would imply b^ > B.
Note that the tax rate T 0 decreases with b as long as b < b^ and becomes at and equal
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to (35) when b exceed b^. In this event, agglomeration economies are su¢ ciently strong for the
central citys government to choose a tax rate that blockades the emergence of SBDs. Note
(35) is the highest rate that satises this property. In other words, the central city behaves as
if it were a monopolist that sets the limit-price to deter the entry of competitors.
When the metropolitan area is monocentric, a deeper institutional fragmentation raises
the corporate tax set in the central city. Indeed, since there are no SBDs, the central city
government has no incentive to reduce its tax rate when the degree of fragmentation increases.
Because its population raises with m, the central city government can shift the cost of the
public good toward rms without a¤ecting the attractiveness of the CBD.
4.2.2 Property tax
It remains to determine the equilibrium property taxes. As long as suburban jurisdictions
attract people, the corresponding governments must tax their residents to nance the local
public good. Since T  = 0, the property tax revenue of a suburban jurisdiction is equal to
the public good cost: tALR = G. Using this expression and (22), we obtain the equilibrium
property tax given by
t =
G


(y   b)2
2
+
(B   y)2
4
  G

 1
: (36)
In suburban jurisdictions, the property tax increases (decreases) with the administrative
boundary b (B) because the scal basis of a suburban jurisdiction shrinks (expands). For the
same reason, a larger number of suburban jurisdictions leads to a higher property tax. The
central cityseconomic boundary also inuences the property tax rate t. However, unlike b
that always triggers a tax hike, an increase in y may generate a tax drop. Indeed, dt=dy < 0
if and only y > (2b + B)=3 or, equivalently, E= > (B + b) =2. In other words, an expansion
of the central citys economic boundary allows the suburban governments to decrease their
property tax if and and only if commuting costs are low enough, agglomeration economies are
high, or both.
As for the central city, its budget constraint implies that the equilibrium property tax
satises the relationship:
t0 =
G  T 0my
ALR0
where ALR0 depends on t0. There is no need to solve this equation, however. Indeed, once
T 0my
is determined, the value of t0ALR0 is constant regardless of the value of t0 (see (24)).
Put di¤erently, once the business tax is chosen, the budget constraint is satised through the
adjustment of the land tax base ALR0 only. Thus, there is a continuum of property tax
equilibria. Note, however, that the actual value of t0 has no impact on the common utility level
in the metropolitan area.
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4.3 Is the CBD too large or too small?
Comparing (11) and (17) reveals that the CBD reaches its rst-best size if and only if T0 = T ,
whereas scal competition yields a positive tax di¤erential equal to T 0 . In accordance with
the literature, we nd that scal competition delivers an ine¢ cient outcome, which takes here
the concrete form of too small a CBD. In other words, a fragmented metropolitan area in
which tax competition prevails is ine¢ cient. As shown in subsection 5.2, the desirability of
tax harmonization across the metropolitan area is an artefact of our modelling strategy of
agglomeration economies.
Furthermore, under tax harmonization, (17) implies that y = y is independent of the
common business tax rate T . In this case, the central city would lean a high business rate
because the tax exporting e¤ect Tm(y   b) increases linearly with T . It then follows from (26)
that consumers in the central city are better o¤ when T is larger. Conversely, as shown by (27)
that decreases with T , residents in the suburban jurisdictions are worse o¤. As a consequence,
under tax harmonization, the central city and the edge cities have opposing interests, thus
highlighting the di¢ culty for the jurisdictions to agree on a common tax rate.
Observe that the e¢ ciency loss generated by the misallocation of capital decreases when
the central city population is raised. Indeed, when b increases the central city chooses to set a
lower business tax because the fraction of workers residing outside its limit decreases (the extent
of tax exporting shrinks). The administrative boundary at which the misallocation of capital
vanishes under tax competition is given by the solution to y(b) = y, where y is the optimal
economic boundary of the central city. Therefore, a planner seeking the e¢ cient allocation of
capital under tax competition chooses the administrative boundary b = ~b, which exceeds the
optimal boundary b. In this event, there is no cross-border commuting, hence no tax exporting,
which is precisely the source for the misallocation of capital. In doing so, the planner does not
deliver the social outcome (~b > b). Indeed, the central city is too large, whereas the suburban
jurisdictions are too small. This results in a suboptimal distribution of people across local
public goods. Conversely, choosing b for the administrative boundary of the central city leads
to an insu¢ cient concentration of jobs in the CBD (y(b) < y). In sum, under corporate tax
competition, when the population size of the central city is optimal, the CBD is too small,
whereas the central city is too large when the size of the CBD is optimal.
Likewise, a larger number of suburban jurisdictions exacerbates scal competition. This in-
centivizes the central citys government to decrease its tax rate, thus reducing the misallocation
of capital.
To summarize,
Proposition 3 In a polycentric metropolitan area, corporate tax competition yields insu¢ cient
concentration of jobs and rms in the CBD. Furthermore, the e¢ ciency loss decreases when
26
the relative population size of the central city increases and/or the metropolitan area gets more
fragmented.
4.4 Central city limits and metropolitan fragmentation
We now consider a second-best approach in which the planner chooses the central citys admin-
istrative boundary or the number of suburban jurisdictions, which maximizes the total welfare
within the metropolitan area, prior to the game described above. In other words, the planner
rst chooses the welfare-maximizing value of b, or m, and then lets consumers, rms and local
governments to pursue their own interest. It is readily veried that, when the metropolitan
area is monocentric, the rst-best and second-best approaches yield the same city size and the
same degree of fragmentation. Therefore, from now on we focus on the case of polycentric
metropolitan areas.
The administrative limit of the central city maximizing total welfare when T0 and T are
given by the equilibrium tax rates is given by
b =
2E + ( + 16)B
3 + 16(m+ 1)
where y > b > b for m  2 and B > b as long as B > y. Hence, as in the rst-best solution,
the welfare-maximizing boundary under tax competition involves institutional fragmentation.
However, unlike the rst-best solution, suburban jurisdictions are smaller than the central city.
Because tax competition favors the edge cities at the expense of the central city, the second-best
approach aims to reduce this distortion by fostering a bigger central city.
The planner may also determine the degree of fragmentation of the metropolitan area m
that maximizes the total welfare given by W sT = W0 + mW . This is implicitly given by the
rst-order condition:
@W sT
@m
=  G+ E
4
E + b

+
3
16

L2
m2
  b2

+ 

L2
m2
  (1 + 2m) b2

= 0 (37)
with @2W sT=@m
2 < 0. As in the rst best analysis, for a given administrative border b, m
increases with population size (L) and agglomeration economies (E) but decreases with public
expenditures (G). However, tax competition incentivizes the planner to establish a more frag-
mented metropolitan area than in the rst-best conguration Indeed, the optimality condition
(37) evaluated at b = b and m = m implies that
@W sT
@m

m=m;b=b
=
3
16
"
L
3m
2
 

b  2E
3
2#
which is positive for all m  2. Therefore, the planner raises the number of edge cities, or
reduces their population size, to alleviate the e¢ ciency loss associated with the insu¢ cient
concentration of rms in the CBD.
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To sum up,
Proposition 4 Assume a polycentric metropolitan area in which the planner chooses the limit
of the central city or the number of jurisdictions. Then, the welfare-maximizing boundary is
such that the metropolitan area is formed by several jurisdictions, while there is commuting
from the suburban jurisdictions to the central city. Furthermore, the second-best central city
size is larger than the rst-best city size.
Because the rst-best and second-best approaches yield the same outcome when the metropol-
itan area monocentric while b > b when the metropolitan area is polycentric, we may conclude
that the planner simultaneously chooses to reduce the economic size of the central city through
the emergence of SBDs and to make the central city population bigger. In other words, the
administrative and economic boundaries of the central city do not move in the same direction.
The reason for this rather unexpected result is that the planner cares only about congestion
costs when the metropolitan area is monocentric, whereas he also takes commuting costs and
agglomeration economies into account when the metropolitan area is polycentric.
5 Spillovers
Large metropolitan areas are replete with external e¤ects of di¤erent types. The usual suspects
are the consumption by suburbanites working in the CBD of public services provided by the
central city and the presence of agglomeration economies and spillovers between rms. In
this section, we discuss what our main ndings become in each of these two cases. As in
the foregoing, we rst consider the optimal outcome, and then characterize the equilibrium
generated by tax competition.
5.1 Public good spillovers
So far, we have neglected the possibility for the suburbanites working in the CBD to consume
the public services provided in the central city. Instead, we now assume that in-commuters
cannot be excluded from the consumption of these services. In this case, suburbanites working
in the CBD benet from both the public goods provided in their own jurisdiction and in the
central city.
5.1.1 The optimal metropolitan area
That suburbanites consume public services supplied in the central city is known to be a major
source of distortion in the allocation of public resources within metropolitan areas. Therefore,
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the analysis of Section 3 is no longer valid in presence of public good spillovers. This is because
the planner faces a further trade-o¤: on the one hand, the suburbanitesenjoy an additional
utility gain given by m (y   b)G; on the other hand, the public good provided by the central
city is more congested, and thus generates an additional cost equal to  (my)2    (mb)2. If
the total net utility is negative, that is, G < m(y + b), the analysis of Section 3 holds true.
When the net gain is positive, the social welfare function becomes
WT = mBG+m (y   b)G+myE   my
2
2
 m

B   y
2
2
   (my)2   m (B   b)2 : (38)
Di¤erentiating (38) with respect to b and y yields the optimal administrative and economic
boundaries:
bsp = B   G
2
< B ysp =
2E + 2G+ B
3 + 4m
(39)
where bsp > 0 if and only if 2B exceeds G, a condition we assume to hold.
The question we address is to gure out how public good spillovers shape the optimal
organization of the metropolitan area. One way consists in comparing ysp with y and bsp
with b. The expression (39) shows that the central citys population size shrinks, whereas its
economic size expands with G. More precisely, we have bsp < b and ysp > y if and only if
G > 2m (2E + B) =3 : (40)
which implies that G exceeds m(ysp + bsp).
When (40) holds, the presence of public good spillovers leads the planner to choose a smaller
central city but a larger CBD because the weight of the term m (y   b)G in (38) is high. In
this case, we have ysp   bsp > y   b > 0, which implies a deeper discrepancy between the two
city limits.
By contrast, when (40) does not hold, we still have ysp bsp > 0 as long as G > m(ysp+bsp).
As a consequence, we always have ysp bsp > 0. Furthermore, it is optimal to have a spillover in
the consumption of the pubic good. In brief, if G is su¢ ciently large, cross-border consumption
of public goods is socially desirable.
5.1.2 The decentralized outcome
As in the foregoing, we assume that G exceeds the congestion cost generated by the larger
number of users, for otherwise in-commuters would not consume the central public services.
The indirect utility of a consumer living in the central city becomes v0(x)  V0(x) m(y  b),
while the indirect utility of a suburbanite working in the central city is given by v0i (x) 
V 0i (x) my+G. Equalizing v0(x) and v0i (x) yields the equilibrium economic boundary of the
central city:
ysp(T0; T ) =
B
3 + 2m
+
2 (E +G  T0 + T )
3 + 2m
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which increases (decreases) with G () because the central city becomes more (less) attractive
to the suburbanites.
Evidently, the government of the central city internalizes the congestion e¤ects generated by
the cross-commuters. As for the suburban governments, two cases may arise: (i) they focus only
upon the welfare e¤ects of their own supply of public services; (ii) they adopt an opportunistic
behavior by internalizing the welfare e¤ects of the central citys public services consumed by
their out-commuters. In what follows, we consider the rst case; the second one, which is solved
in Appendix B, yields similar results.
The central city government maximizes the social welfare functionW0 m(ysp b) whereas
the suburban governments maximize (27) in which y(T0; T ) given by (17) is replaced with
ysp(T0; T ). Di¤erentiating the corresponding expressions, it can be shown that the equilibrium
business tax rates are given by
T sp0 =
(3 + 2m) (2E + B   3b) + 6m`0
4 (3 + m)
T sp =
m [2E + B + 3b  2 (m  1) `0]
2 (3 + m)
 G: (41)
It follows immediately from (31) that the business tax set by the central city is higher in
the presence than in the absence of public good spillovers. The reason is easy to grasp. More
workers lure the CBD because they can enjoy the public services provided by the central city.
This entices more rms to set up there. The extent of tax exporting increases, whereas its
public services are subject to more congestion. Both e¤ects lead the central city to increase
its business tax. Moreover, because the consumption of the central public services by outside
workers makes the CBD more attractive, the suburban governments choose to subsidy rms to
restore their attractiveness (T sp < 0). Therefore, T sp0  T sp exceeds T 0  T . As a consequence,
the CBD is smaller in the presence than in the absence of public good spillovers.
At the above tax rates, the economic boundary of the central city is such that
ysp =
2E + B + 3b  2 (m  1) `0
2 (3 + m)
so that T sp = mysp  G < 0 whereas ysp > b if and only if
b <
2E + B
3 + 2m2
:
Note that ysp = y when  = 0. By contrast, when  is positive, we have ysp < y. In
addition, the stronger the congestion e¤ect (a higher ), the smaller the CBD. All in all, the
economic size of the central city shrinks in the presence of public good spillovers. Moreover,
it is readily veried that ysp > b and G > mysp imply ysp > ysp. Because ysp grows with G
whereas ysp remains constant, we may conclude that stronger public good spillovers exacerbate
the insu¢ cient concentration of rms and jobs in the CBD.
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Observe that the existence of spillovers has both expected and unexpected redistributional
implications for consumers living in the central and peripheral jurisdictions. First, the out-
commuting suburbanites benet from more public services whereas the central citys residents
bear a higher congestion cost. This is not the end of the story, however. Since the business tax
paid by the CBD rms is higher, the central-citys workers get a lower pay. By contrast, the
SBD workers earn a higher wage as the suburban rms are subsidized. As a consequence, central
citys residents are hurt twice through an externality e¤ect and an income e¤ect. The free-riding
problem between the central city and the suburban jurisdictions thus has implications that go
beyond the standard consumption e¤ects generated by spillovers. In particular, it makes the
cooperation between the central and edge cities even more compelling for the metropolitan area
to be e¢ cient.
Proposition 5 comprises a summary.
Proposition 5 Assume that the suburbanites working in the CBD consume the central city
public services. Then, the central city government raises its business tax whereas the subur-
ban governments subsidize rms. Furthermore, public good spillovers exacerbate the insu¢ cient
concentration of rms and jobs within the metropolitan area.
5.1.3 The central city as a big supplier of public services
The central city often supplies a broader range of public services than the suburban jurisdictions.
It is, therefore, legitimate to ask what the above ndings become in such a context. To show
it, we assume that the central city provides a public good of size G. Alternatively, if G is a
CES-bundle of di¤erentiated public services, G represents a wider range of services.
The optimal population size of the central city increases because the additional congestion
costs borne by the central citys residents are o¤set by a higher utility stemming from the
consumption of the public services. It is readily veried that the optimal central city border b
is now given by
b =
B
m+ 1
+
(   1)G
2(m+ 1)
which need not be smaller than B. As a result, the institutional structure of the metropolitan
area now depends on the relative provision of public services between the central city and the
suburban jurisdictions. The optimal size of the central city increases with the range of public
services it provides, whereas the suburban jurisdictions shrink. In the limit, the planner chooses
to have a single jurisdiction only if (   1)G > 2L, a condition that is unlikely to hold in a
large metropolitan area.
Note that higher public expenditures in the central city do not a¤ect its optimal economic
boundary as long as the suburbanites do not consume this good. Thus, the optimal metropolitan
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area may be institutionally fragmented while having an integrated labor market or may involve
a single jurisdiction together with several employment centers. Moreover, since the business
tax competition process does not depend on G, this asymmetry in public policies has no impact
the jurisdictionsbusiness taxes, and thus Proposition 3 holds true.
When suburbanites working in the CBD consume the central citys public services, this one
becomes even more attractive. In this case, the discrepancy between the optimal administrative
and economic boundaries is exacerbate. Indeed, the administrative limit in (39) is una¤ected
because the planner has no reason to di¤erentiate across CBD-workers. By contrast, ysp in-
creases with  because more consumers are able to enjoy the wider array of public services
provided by the central city. Furthermore, as shown by (41) in which G is replaced with G,
the suburban governments lower their business tax. As a consequence, the tax gap widens and
Proposition 5 holds true.
5.2 Firm spillovers
As mentioned in subsection 2.3, treating E as a constant constitutes a crude approximation
of agglomeration economies and rmsspillovers. Given the importance played by these e¤ects
in the working of a metropolitan area, we nd it important to study what our main ndings
become under a more general specication for the agglomeration economies in which E varies
with the distribution of rms within the metropolitan area. To this end, we consider a setting
used in the literature (Baldwin et al., 2005; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004).
When a rm is located in the CBD, its prots become 0 = I   (w0   E0)  T0 where
E0 = n0 + (n  n0) (42)
stands for the productivity gain associated with a central location. In this expression, E0
increases with the number n0 of rms located in the central city, whereas  2 (0; 1) measures
the intensity of the spillovers between the CBD and each SBD. Hence, the benet of being
located in the CBD rises with the number of rms that locate therein as well as with the
intensity of the spillovers generated by the SBDs. When a rm sets up in the ith edge city, its
prot function is i = I   (wi   Ei)  Ti with
Ei = ni + n0 (43)
where ni is the number of rms located in the ith SBD. Hence, an edge city benets from inter-
actions with the central city only, whereas the central city benets from nonmarket interactions
with all edge cities. In the symmetric case (ni = (n  n0)=m), E0 exceeds Ei when
n0
n  n0 >
1=m  
1  
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which always holds when  > 1=m. In other words, the CBD has a comparative advantage
when  is su¢ ciently large, which is similar to assuming that E is a positive constant, as in
Sections 3 and 4.
5.2.1 The optimal metropolitan area
Using (42) and (43) shows that the sum of productivity gains associated with a given distrib-
ution of rms is equal to E = E0n0 + iEini with
E = my [my + m (B   y)] +m (B   y) (B   y + my) :
It is then readily veried that maximizing productivity gains within the metropolitan area
fosters a monocentric conguration (B = y). This is a reection of the comparative advantage
of the CBD, which unlike the SBDs interacts with each SBD. However, this argument disregards
the social costs generated by workerscommuting ows. The social welfare function (9) becomes
W = E   CC  GC   PC.
If the optimal administrative boundary of the central city is still given by b, its optimal
economic boundary now depends on the intensity of spillovers among rms. If
 >   m+ 1
2m
  3
8m
holds, then the optimal economic limit
ys =
B + 4B(m  1)
3   4(m+ 1) + 8m >
b
as in Section 3.
When  < , the social welfare function is convex. In this event, the optimal boundary
is given by y = B. Hence, when spillovers between the CBD and SBDs are strong, the
planner chooses to reduce total commuting costs by decentralizing jobs. By contrast, when
these spillovers are weak, the social optimum involves the agglomeration of rms in the CBD,
for otherwise the productive e¢ ciency losses would be too high.
5.2.2 The decentralized outcome
The study of the tax competition game under (42) and (43) requires some heavy algebra. First
of all, it is readily veried that the worker indi¤erent between working in the CBD or in a SBD
is located at
ys(T0; T ) =
B + 2B (m  1)  2 (T0   T )
3   2(m+ 1) + 4m (44)
which varies with the tax di¤erential T0 T as (17). Rewriting the social welfare functions (25)
and (27) under ys(T0; T ), we obtain
dW0
dT0
= m(ys   b) +mT0 dy
s
dT0
+m(1  )dy
s
dT0
:
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Since the absolute value of dys=dT0 decreases with , the third term in the right-hand
side of this expression decreases with , and thus the impact of the rst two terms becomes
predominant when  is su¢ ciently large.
As for the suburban jurisdictions, the tax incentives are more complex because the welfare
of a CBD-worker residing in a suburban jurisdiction is a¤ected by the CBD-externality, whereas
the welfare of a SBD-worker is a¤ected by the SBD-externality.
Solving the tax game and plugging the tax rates in (44), we get the following equilibrium
value for the central citys economic boundary:
ys =
B + 4B(m  1) + 2b(2m  1 m) + 3b
6   6(m+ 1) + 12m :
which di¤ers from ys. As in Section 4, tax competition distorts the allocation of jobs and rms
within the metropolitan area. Whereas exogenous agglomeration economies always generate
too small a CBD, this need not be true when spillovers are endogenous. Indeed, ys exceeds
ys when spillovers between the CBD and SBDs are weak. Otherwise, as in Proposition 3, the
equilibrium size of the CBD is smaller than its optimal size. The reason for this di¤erence
in results stems from the fact that the additional benet of a central location increases with
y at a decreasing rate when  rises. Therefore, prots become less sensitive to the locational
choices made by rms. As a result, when  is high (low) the central city government has a
weak (strong) incentive to decrease its business tax, which fosters the emergence of a small
(big) CBD.
The following proposition is a summary.
Proposition 6 In a polycentric metropolitan area corporate tax competition yields too small
a CBD when spillovers between the CBD and the SBDs are su¢ ciently strong. Otherwise, the
CBD is too large.
6 Concluding Remarks
Metropolitan areas are non-legal entities that play a key role in the economic development of
emerging and developed countries alike. This probably explains why political scientists have
long been interested in issues related to metropolitan governance. The earliest approach that
we are aware of -the regionalism approach that continues to shape the political debates -views
the multiplicity of political jurisdictions as inherently ine¢ cient. Political fragmentation would
limit the ability to deal with area-wide urban problems that transcend local jurisdictions.
The prescription is then to promote metropolitan governments and a better correspondence
between administrative and functional or economic areas. In contrast to this view, the public
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choice approach, based on Tiebout (1956) and Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961), does
not see systematic ine¢ ciency in the polycentric political organization of metropolitan areas.
Similar to market economies where rms compete to o¤er the best good at the best price,
political fragmentation would allow residents to select the jurisdiction that o¤ers them the best
tax/service package.
Our general equilibrium model delivers a clear-cut message that strongly suggests an inter-
mediate approach. Indeed, both the rst-best and second-best solutions involve institutional
fragmentation within the metropolitan area as well as an economic limit of the central city
that encompasses its administrative boundary. This points to the need for multifunctional
governance: small things should be managed by local jurisdictions, and big things by a
metropolitan government. Labor and transport issues in particular should be handled at the
metropolitan area level. Although derived from a simple model, these conclusions are su¢ cient
to show that policy recommendations based on the regionalism and public choice approaches
are unwarranted.
However, although we recognize that political fragmentation is not bad per se, the un-
derlying tax competition process leads to an ine¢ cient distribution of jobs. This leads us to
formulate some policy recommendations in the spirit of what is known in North America as
New Regionalism (Savitch and Vogel, 2000) - mixing a polycentric political system with
inter-municipal cooperation to solve mutual problems. To be precise, our analysis suggests
that where the city limits are drawn matters for the e¢ ciency of the metropolitan area be-
cause the placement may generate a misallocation of local public goods and a mismanagement
of agglomeration economies. Moreover, corporate tax coordination is likely to remedy many
distortions generated by tax exporting. These two recommendations would seem the minimal
requirements to promote more e¢ cient metropolitan areas.
Note that our framework could also serve to address more controversial issues in local
public nance. According to Inman (2009), rethinking the governance of the metropolitan ar-
eas through Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) and Neighborhood Improvement Districts
could be a way to improve the scal performance of large metropolitan areas. BIDs are business
associations and can be considered self-nancing private governments that o¤er supplemental
services to their members. By restoring market-driven incentives in location choices, the de-
velopment of BIDs within the central city would make it more attractive, thus strengthening
agglomeration economies. Helsley and Strange (1998) analyze such organizations and show
that their welfare e¤ects on consumers are ambiguous and complex. However, their analysis
should be extended to the case of an urban framework with the aim of determining the impact
of private governments on the spatial organization of rms and consumers.
Yet it is fair to say that our ndings have been obtained under several simplifying assump-
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tions; thus care is needed in interpreting the ndings. First, we did not address competition in
public goods, an issue that is notoriously di¢ cult, especially because many models are plagued
with the non-existence of a Nash equilibrium. In this respect, it is worth noting that our model
may be interpreted as one in which jurisdictions avoid the damaging e¤ects of a race to the
bottom by coordinating their supply of public services. Therefore, even in the absence of such
distortions, our analysis has unveiled new sources of market failure. Moreover, it is well known
that one political and social di¢ culty encountered within metropolitan areas stems from the
heterogeneity of households that cluster in specic neighborhoods, which in turn generates
spatial discrimination across socioeconomic groups. This issue has been tackled in the mono-
centric city model of urban economics but has not been explored in the context of a polycentric
metropolitan area. Lastly, we did not allow consumers to choose a variable lot size by trad-
ing the homogeneous good against land. This means that a non-uniform population density
emerges at the rst stage of the game, which is treated parametrically in the subsequent stages.
Several of our results remain valid but the determination of the equilibrium land rent within
each jurisdiction is a more delicate issue.
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Appendix A
Assume that y  b, which is equivalent to b  ~b. In this event, (26) no longer describes the
total welfare in the central city, which is now given by the following expression:
W0 = (I + E   T0)my + (b  y)m(I   T ) m (y
)2
2
 m b
2   (y)2
2
 `20   (F   T0my)
where y is given by (17). It is then readily veried that
dW0
dT0
= m(E + T )
dy
dT0
< 0: (A.1)
Since y decreases with T0, the above inequality implies that, for any T , the best reply
T 0 (T ) must be such that
y[T 0 (T ); T ] = b:
As for the total welfare in a suburban jurisdiction, it becomes
W = (B   b)(I   T )  
2

B + y
2
  b
2
  
2

B   B   y

2
2
 `2   [F   (B   y)T ]:
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Di¤erentiating W with respect to T yields the rst-order condition:
dW
dT
= b  y  
h
2
(y   b) + T
i dy
dT
= 0
with d2W=dT 2 < 0. Because b   y = 0 must hold in equilibrium, the above equality implies
that T  = 0 in (A.1). Plugging this value into (17) and solving for T0 yields
T 0 = E +
3
2

B
3
  b

:
In sum, the marginal worker is located outside the central city (b < y) or at the city border
(y = b).
Appendix B
Assume now that the suburban governments internalize the spillovers and congestion costs
associated with the consumption of the central city services by their out-commuters. The
objective function of the central citys government is unchanged, but suburban governments
now maximize
W sp = W sp + (ysp   b)G   (ysp   b)mysp:
The corresponding equilibrium tax rates are given by
T sp0 =
(3 + 2m) (L+ 2mE + 2mG)
12m ( + m)
+
(3 + 2m)G
6 ( + m)
+
2`0 (2m  3)  9b 2
12 ( + m)
T sp =   (L+ 2mE)
6 ( + m)
   [2mG  `0 (3 + 4m)]
6 ( + m)
:
The business tax set by the central city government thus increases with the extent of the
spillover whereas the subsidy paid by the suburban governments increases.
The central citys economic border is now given by
ysp =
E
3 ( + m)
+
B + 3b+ 2`0
6 ( + m)
+
G
3 ( + m)
which implies that the economic border of the central city increases withG because the existence
of spillovers make the central city more attractive as a workplace.
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